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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines controversies regarding the use of private military 
companies (PMCs) as defense contractors.  The history of privatized security, 
consideration of ethical and legal issues, and examination of three case studies allows 
assessment of PMCs in accordance with five criteria for success:  competence, cost 
efficiency analysis, control, flexibility and impact on state armed forces. After examining 
three case studies representing a variety of types of PMCs (Executive Outcomes in 
Angola and Sierra Leone, MPRI in Croatia, and Blackwater in Afghanistan and Iraq), the 
thesis finds that although PMCs can be used legitimately and to good effect, expanded 
use of PMCs may pose serious risks to U.S. forces, national security objectives, and U.S. 
political legitimacy.  
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[King George III of England] is at this time transporting large Armies of 
foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation, and 
tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & Perfidy scarcely 
paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a 
civilized nation. 1   — Declaration of Independence (1776) 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has deployed for 
offensive operations against the global jihad terror network and supporters of 
international terrorism. The primary theaters of operation are Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are limited in number, and given the high demand for 
SOF in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. military general purpose forces are 
performing Special Operations-type missions.  For example, they have assumed a large 
share of the responsibility for training Iraqi army and police units.  While they perform 
admirably, general purpose forces cannot be everywhere and do everything necessary to 
establish security and transition control to the Iraqi forces.   
To supplement the U.S. military, approximately 20,000 armed, and uncounted 
more unarmed, security personnel from private military companies (PMCs) serve in Iraq, 
with annual contracts estimated at over $1 billion.2 The PMCs thrive in Iraq because of 
the gap between the Iraqi government's ambitions and its capabilities.  The role of PMCs 
overall appears to be growing in importance and scope, as their contracts are lucrative 
and the U.S. military is unwilling or unable to conduct the myriad of tasks the PMCs 
currently perform for the government.  
Private military companies perform specialized tasks ranging from Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) to limited Special Operations (SO) like 
Foreign Internal Defense. The success of Executive Outcomes' (EO) work in West Africa 
                                                 
1 “The Declaration of Independence,” 1776, available online at 
http://www.ushistory.org/Declaration/document/index.htm (accessed April 28, 2008). 
2 Shadow Company, DVD, directed by Nick Bicanic and Jason Bourque (A Purpose Built Film, 2006). 
 2
in 1994-1995, discussed in Chapter IV, is a blueprint for privatizing security functions 
and PMC operations.  Companies like Blackwater Worldwide and Military Professional 
Resources, Inc. (MPRI) have government contracts to provide security and train 
indigenous forces. Many of the tasks PMCs perform are not exclusively SO missions, but 
the individual skills and training needed to accomplish these tasks necessitate SO-type 
capabilities.  Currently, only the DoS employs PMCs directly for security operations.3  
Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp protect U.S. diplomats, while Vinnell 
Corporation and Armor Group train Iraqi Ministry of Justice guards, standard police 
units, and basic site security companies.4 
As the GWOT continues and the U.S. engages in more irregular warfare, a rise in 
private armies would be consistent with predictions by Van Creveld.5  The persistent 
terrorist threat and increasing American military and political involvement increases 
opportunities for PMCs. Blackwater employees state unofficially that that Blackwater 
Worldwide proposes manning a brigade-sized force for targeting operations and other 
direct action missions to support Multinational Division-Iraq (MND-I).6  While the DoD 
has not addressed Blackwater’s proposal and it is unlikely that PMCs will assume a 
combat role, the option of outsourcing combat action to PMCs must be assessed 
objectively, with a realistic understanding of the consequences of privatizing combat 
operations.   
The recent influx of PMCs in the GWOT affects the traditional force structure in 
combat zones by introducing a legitimate, non-state actor authorized to use deadly force. 
This thesis examines the role of PMCs in achieving U.S. national security objectives. 
                                                 
3 Bob Andrews, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security, personal 
interviews with author, August and September 2007. 
4 The author conducted an OIF deployment to Hillah, Iraq between March to October 2005.  During 
that time period, he came across many PMCs operating in and around the battlespace and conducted 
coordinations with them.  They discussed their charters and scope of operations at the tactical and 
operational levels in the shared battlespace and within the framework of the Iraqi situation. 
5 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 216-217. 
6 Elaine McKewon, “Blackwater Sued for Mercenary Contract Injuries,” www.bayoubuzz.com, 
October 12, 2007, 
http://www.bayoubuzz.com/News/World/Iraq/US/Blackwater_Sued_For_Mercenary_Contract_Injuries__4
884.asp (accessed May 10, 2008). 
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B. TYPES OF PMCS 
Defining the range of privatized security operations allows the thesis to focus on 
those most relevant for U.S. government use.  Private companies can be divided into two 
main categories: combat support/sustainment-related, and combat-related.  Combat 
support/sustainment companies specialize in logistics. Examples of sustainment 
companies include Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR), Titan Corporation and Bechtel 
Group, Inc., specializing, respectively, in logistics, radio and computer maintenance and 
networking, and barrier construction.   
This thesis focuses on combat-related companies that either participate in combat 
in a direct or indirect role or perform a direct security function and are authorized the use 
of violence. The combat-related companies tend to be security oriented and directed at 
the enemy threat. They can be subdivided into four categories: private combat companies 
(PCC), private military companies (PMC), commercial security companies (CSC), and 
freelance operators.  Private military companies can be further divided into proxy 
military companies and private security companies (PSC) (see Figure 1 and the 
Appendix).  Proxy military companies are private companies that act in accordance with 
their parent nation’s national objectives.  Proxy companies may or may not use direct 
force, but always seek the explicit permission of their parent nation to accept a contract of 
an application of force nature.  This thesis examines companies in the categories of PCC 
and PMC, as these best illustrate the capabilities and repercussions of privatization in 
combat zones.  This thesis will not examine private military companies performing 




Figure 1.   Degree of Legitimate Violence Authorized 
Many proxy military companies fall under the larger PMC definition, but not all 
PMCs are proxy forces.  Similarly, private security companies are a type of PMC, but 
with a comparatively reduced mission set.  It is important to distinguish between PCCs 
and freelance operators, although current political and social boundaries limit the 
employment of both.7  In this thesis, the case study of Executive Outcomes in Africa 
illustrates a private combat company. Blackwater is discussed as the prototypical "all-
purpose" private military company.  The category of proxy military company is 
represented by MPRI. 
C. PMCS IN COMBAT ZONES:  POTENTIAL PROBLEMS  
There are many potential problems with employing PMCs in combat zones. 
Among the most important is the problem of legitimacy. In a democracy, the state has a 
                                                 
7 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military 
Companies (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
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monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the interest of public order.8 The state 
cannot abandon its responsibilities, and its legitimacy may be questioned when 
government responsibilities are outsourced to private companies.   The unclear distinction 
between military and corporate forces in any combat zone, and especially in a dynamic 
and violent environment like Iraq, can lead to confusion over the legitimate use of force.  
When the U.S. government outsources its responsibilities, it seeks to control PMCs 
through specific contractual requirements that include parameters for the use of force. 
In practice, PMCs are an extension of a sovereign government. Backlash against 
the PMCs (for example, public disapproval of the disproportionate use of force) can 
affect how the world views that nation’s forces.  The U.S. currently employs a large 
number of PMCs to   The U.S. government needs the flexibility to leverage PMCs but at 
the same time must consider the effects of using PMCs on the overall mission.  If PMCs 
are perceived as errant children, then national credibility and legitimacy are eroded.  
However, if PMCs can positively support and augment DoD forces, then deploying them 
is beneficial to the U.S. government.  This thesis assesses the utility of PMCs for meeting 
U.S. policy objectives, with special attention to potential problems of using PMCs in 
combat zones and questions of accountability and oversight.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if PMCs are value-added to U.S. foreign 
policy objectives in combat zones, and under what conditions they should be employed. 
The methodology used to address these questions is primarily qualitative.  To analyze the 
performance of PMCs, this study considers five evaluation measurements, described in 
this introductory chapter.  The five evaluation criteria are applied to three case studies.   
The thesis relies on published reports and news articles, as well as interviews with 
policy makers and PMC operators. Additionally, it draws heavily from the author's 
experiences as a U.S. military officer deployed throughout the globe.  The author became 
familiar with Blackwater Worldwide, Triple Canopy, Armor Group and other PMCs on a 
                                                 
8 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1964), 154. 
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recent deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in al-Hillah, Iraq, in 
2005.  He also interacted with PMCs supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan, and on missions to Colombia, Peru, and the Balkans.9     
The U.S. government is the largest employer of PMCs.10 A brief history of 
privatized security is given as background to the current PMC situation. The thesis 
presents three case studies: Executive Outcome’s actions in Angola (1994) and Sierra 
Leone (1995), MPRI's actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994), and Blackwater 
Worldwide’s actions in the GWOT (2003 - present). The case studies illustrate the use 
and transformation of privatized security companies to support military aims. The thesis 
concludes with an overall assessment of PMC usage and proposed guidelines for PMC 
employment to maximize their effectiveness for the strategic implementation of foreign 
policy.   
E. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The determination of PMCs’ utility requires considering several factors. While 
the PMCs operate within two distinct worlds, the military and the corporate, in conflict 
zones, PMCs operate in a military fashion and ultimately answer to their employer, the 
government. This thesis uses five objective criteria to assess PMCs as military 
contractors: competence, cost efficiency, control, flexibility, and impact on government 
military forces.  
1. Competence 
The key metric is competence, defined as the capability of the PMC to fulfill its 
contract with the necessary personnel, equipment, training, technical and tactical 
capabilities.  Field experience, the access to mission appropriate equipment, and the 
ability to integrate battlefield intelligence into operations all factor in to measuring 
                                                 
9 Interactions with PMCs have led the author to conclude that the face of war is changing, becoming 
simultaneously more compartmentalized, more distributed, and more violent. 
10 Jeremy Scahill, “The Mercenary Revolution: Flush with Profits from the Iraq War, Military 
Contractors See a World of Business Opportunities,” The Indypendant, August 15, 2007, 
http://www.indypendent.org/2007/08/10/the-mercenary-revolution-flush-with-profits-from-the-iraq-war-
military-contractors-see-a-world-of-business-opportunities (accessed May 24, 2008).  
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competence.  It is important to delineate the independent metric of competence against 
the dependent variable of effectiveness.  Competence measures the military ability of the 
PMC to accomplish the mission, not the degree of overall effectiveness.  A PMC could 
be less competent militarily but still highly successful in fulfilling the contract.  The PMC 
must deliver the contracted services to be considered effective. This metric evaluates the 
PMC’s actions and how well they accomplish the mission.   Failure to accomplish the 
tasks specified in the contract may lead termination of services and possible federal 
prosecution.   Competence is an important measurement because it affects the outcome of 
the mission, as well as the financial future of the PMC.  
2. Cost Efficiency Analysis 
The cost efficiency analysis focuses on determining which is more efficient: 
military manpower or a defense contractor.  The financial cost of raising, training, 
employing, sustaining, and redeploying a military force is significant.  Does the practical 
nature of a commercial turnkey solution override the legitimizing factor of sending the 
military as the nation’s official representatives?  If so, then the decision to employ a PMC 
is sound.  Ultimately, the government must determine if it is more advantageous to use its 
national military force or a private entity.  
3. Control 
Control is defined as the level of accountability and influence the employing state 
can exert on the PMC.  This criterion is measured by examining the internal and external 
influences on PMCs that drive the companies in executing their contracts.  Control is 
important because it directly influences the legitimacy of both the PMC and their state 
sponsor. 
4. Flexibility 
Flexibility is the ability of a PMC to rapidly adjust to a change in mission 
requirements; it is a measure of agility and versatility.  Flexibility implies multifunctional 
capabilities when faced with diverging mission sets.  It can be measured by examining 
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the variety of mission profiles a PMC is willing to undertake, as well as its ability to 
move from one mission to another during the course of a contract.  There is a limit to 
flexibility for both contractors and military units, in that contracts must be consistent with 
the organization's existing skill sets.  Inherent in the concept of flexibility is the capacity 
for transportation and self-sufficient logistical support.  Flexibility is an important 
evaluation criterion because it indicates the PMC's ability to offer a true turn-key 
solution. 
5. Impact on the State’s Military Forces 
The criterion of impact on state military forces describes PMC contributions, 
positive or negative, to the larger military force they assist.  Rarely do PMCs work 
independently, and when they do, they often employ indigenous forces to augment their 
own.  Private military companies impact the larger force by their presence in the 
operational environment and by conducting operations alongside other military and 
paramilitary forces. For example, private military companies may lack the logistical or 
operational support needed for their mission, such as dining and sustainment facilities, or 
a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to respond to trouble.11  Overly aggressive PMCs affect 
the attitudes of indigenous populations towards the state.  Additionally, PMC recruiting 
efforts entice qualified soldiers to leave the military with promises of higher wages.  The 
impact of PMCs on government military forces can be measured through perceptions, 
credibility, duplication of effort, and overall coordination of operations.   
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis contains six chapters, including this introduction.  Chaper II presents a 
brief history of privatized warfare in Western history, focusing on the free companies in 
the Thirty Years War, the Swiss Guard, the Hessians in the American Revolution, and the 
                                                 
11 In the author's personal experience in Iraq, PMC representatives would  stop at the Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC) and coordinate with the Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha (SFOD-
A), requesting that SFOD-A serve as their Quick Reaction Force should they have enemy contact and be 
unable to control the situation.  This presented numerous problems, including communications and 
cryptologic incompatibility, coordination and fire control measures, and authorities.  The author's unit 
always accommodated PMC employees as fellow Americans but never jeopardized their own mission or 
forces beyond operational limits. 
 9
British East India Company.  Chapter III explores the concept of the social contract in 
regard to state and private militaries and presents a variety of ethical and legal 
considerations relevant to the use of private militaries, including a brief description of the 
contracting process.  Three case studies, chosen to reflect a range of PMCs, are presented 
in Chapter IV.  Chapter V presents the analysis of PMCs using the evaluation criteria 
discussed in this introductory chapter.  Concluding comments appear in Chapter VI.  
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATIZED WARFARE 
A. EARLY MERCENARY FORCES 
Mercenary forces have contributed to the industry of warfare at least since 
Pharoah Ramses II ruled Egypt (1279-1213 B.C.).  He employed Shardana mercenaries 
from Iona as his personal guards, as well as 11,000 warriors as foreign auxiliaries.12  The 
practice of selling  personal military knowledge and skills extended into Persia. In 484 
B.C., the Greek mercenary Demaratus warned Xerxes I not to underestimate the Spartans 
at Thermopylae.13  Persian employment of Greek mercenaries continued through 401 
B.C., when Darius III hired Memnon of Rhodes and 10,000 Greek soldiers to fight 
against Alexander the Great at the Battle of Granicus River.14   
The Roman and Byzantine Empires both used the Varangian Guard as personal 
guards and mid-scale maneuver elements.  These Viking people were quintessential 
barbarian mercenaries who would sell any military service to the highest bidder.  
Byzantine employment was a rite of passage for Varangian warriors: Harold III, 
Norway's future king, was a Varangian Guard.15   
The ancient and medieval worlds utilized small groups of fiercely competent 
soldiers-for-hire as personal guards and for large maneuver elements.  The surplus of 
skilled warriors and a growing need for military might, coupled with the impartial 
mercenary loyalty to neither crown nor blood line, provided an attractive and effective 
force controlled by the purse.  It was often easier to purchase an army than to raise, train, 
equip and employ the indigenous population as a fighting force, which entailed removing 
                                                 
12 G. Maspero, History of Egypt, Chaldea, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Vol. 5, 
http://www.archive.org/stream/egypt05maspuoft/egypt05maspuoft_djvu.txt (accessed May 24, 2008).  
13 A. D. Godley, ed., Herodotus, Book VII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 102.   
14 W. J. McCoy, “Memnon of Rhodes at the Granicus,” The American Journal of Philology 110, no. 3 
(Autumn, 1989): 413. 
15 Snorri Sturluson, King Harald's Saga: Harald Hardradi of Norway, trans. Magnus Magnusson and 
Hermann Palsson (New York: Penguin Classics, 1966). 
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them from their agricultural and sustainment roles.16  The problem with mercenaries was 
the threat that someone else would pay more, a difficulty mitigated by keeping the 
mercenary guard force large enough to react to a threat, but small enough to be controlled 
and properly funded.  The control of unleashed mercenary forces was not a priority, as 
these early empires did not fear public reactions of the sort that emerge only with mass 
communications.17 
B. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 
The Thirty Years War ravaged Europe between 1618 and 1648. The battle was 
over new-found nationalism, and the primary military forces were free companies.18  The 
conflict was the culmination of smaller wars over the position of the Church. It was the 
first large scale nation-state war, fought by the German Protestants, the Catholic 
Hapsburgs ruling Spain, Germany and Austria, and the French Catholics.  Because the 
number of foot soldiers on both sides diminished rapidly, eventually mercenary 
companies were paid to serve as proxy forces.   
The original mercenaries in this war came from the British military, idle since the 
end of the Crusades.  The task organization of the British forces resembled today’s 
building block military structure.  Men organized into companies were contracted out to 
fight for both sides.19  These companies expanded during the war and added to the 
destruction by foraging for sustenance. Without accountability or a governing authority to 
discipline them, privateers roamed the land, and mass looting, pillaging and murder were 
widespread.20  Europe suffered through the bloody war and identified the destruction of 
the countryside with mercenaries.  This is the origin of the deep-seated suspicion within 
Western culture of the concept of a “mercenary” and the issues associated with 
                                                 
16 Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1978), 164. 
17 Ibid., 163-167. 
18 Ibid., 163. 
19 Shadow Company. 
20 Tuchman, A Distant Mirror, 222. 
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outsourcing wars.21  The 1648 Peace of Westphalia established national boundaries, and 
large-scale destructive mercenary forces were largely replaced by well-disciplined state 
armies.22 
C. SWISS GUARD 
The Swiss Guard originated with a 14th century mercenary force that served the 
highest bidder.  Swiss mercenaries gained a reputation in the Hundred Years War as a 
force multiplier. Officially founded in 1497, the Swiss Guard was hired by Francis I for 
personal security and site protection. He chose them to capitalize on their reputation and 
add legitimacy to the French monarchy. Their relationship with crown continued until the 
French Revolution in 1789, when many Swiss Guards were executed alongside their 
principals, thus terminating the contract.23   
The Vatican chose the Swiss Guard for site security in 1506 under Pope Julius 
II.24 The relationship between the papacy and the Swiss Guard continues today.  The 
Guard represents loyalty, professionalism, and steadfast dedication to a sacred duty, a 
reputation based on protection and defensive reliability rather than a proactive and 
offensive capability.25  Routine operations, public scrutiny and visibility mean few 
surprises.26  Its Swiss officer corps and international enlisted ranks present a cooperative 
image.  Eschewing political and temporal maneuvering, the Guard preserves its image as 
protector of Catholicism, symbolizing high moral and ethical expectations for Catholics 
                                                 
21 Tuchman, A Distant Mirror, 222. 225. 
22 Ibid., 593. 
23 “Swiss Guard: History,” The Roman Curia, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/swissguard/storia_en.htm#The%20Swiss%20Mercenaries 
(accessed May 13, 2008).  
23 “Inside the Vatican: The Swiss Guards,” National Geographic, November 18, 2001, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/11/1118_vaticanswiss.html (accessed May 21, 2008).  
24 “Swiss Guard: History.”  
25 “Inside the Vatican: The Swiss Guards.”  
26 “Swiss Guard: Uniform of the Swiss Guard,” The Roman Curia, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/swissguard/divisa_en.htm (accessed May 13, 2008). 
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and non-Catholics alike.27 They answer directly to a higher authority, the Pope, and 
portray themselves as stalwart defenders of “right.” The Swiss Guard maintains public 
trust as private military entity committed to a set of ideals and principles.28   
D. HESSIANS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
In 1775, the Continental army of 19,000 was outnumbered by British forces of 
25,000.29  In traditional European military fashion, the British had employed Hessian 
forces to augment their standing army.30  The Hessians were German soldiers impressed 
into service to fight against Washington's troops.31  The Hessians were not soldiers of 
fortune, as they served their respective German princes.  These German princes 
functioned as the comparative Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Hessians at the time. 
However, despite Hessian military professionalism, many Americans viewed them as 
mercenaries and attached a negative connotation.32  Many of America's founders also 
disapproved of mercenaries, associating the outsourcing of military functions with 
political repression.33  This early perception may help explain modern American 
skepticism of privatized security. 
E.  BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY 
The British East India Company, or simply known as the “Company,” was 
originally a capitalist venture of importing South Asian spices to England by a few 
                                                 
27 “Swiss Guard Strikes; Has Served Pope 400 Years,” New York Times, July 27, 1913, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?_r=1&res=980CEFD8153FE633A25754C2A9619C946296D6CF&oref=slogin (accessed May 21, 
2008).  
28 Carol Glatz, “Swiss Guard: Keeping the Peace and Protecting the People for Over 500 Years,” 
Catholic News Service, May 7, 2004, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/swiss.htm (accessed 
May 13, 2008).  
29 John Keegan, Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America (New York: Knopft, 1995), 162. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Richard Patterson, “What Was A 'Hessian?'” Pennsylvania Historic Park Commission, 
http://www.ushistory.org/WashingtonCrossing/history/hessian.htm (accessed May 13, 2008). 
32 Ibid. 
33 “The Declaration of Independence,” 1776, available online at 
http://www.ushistory.org/Declaration/document/index.htm (accessed April 28, 2008). 
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London businessmen.34  They were granted an English Royal Charter by Queen Elizabeth 
I in 1600 and slowly transformed from a commercial venture to a legitimate ruling 
authority over India and other Asian colonies.  After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the 
Company served as a British proxy government and established trade routes from South 
Asia to the West until 1873.35  The Company built up their military and administrative 
capabilities prior to Plassey in order to compete with other foreign trading companies, 
namely the French East India Company.   
The independent and self-sufficient British merchants continued to man the 
Company and established a crown approved Governor-General who could collect 
revenue in India, as well as raise an Army and Police force to maintain control of the 
expanding colonies.36  The Company strengthened their military force by sub-contracting 
Rajputs and Brahmans to form 80% of the Indian Army since the Sepoys were suspect 
following the Battle of Plassey.37  The Company became the de facto ruling authority in 
South Asia and governed a geographic area larger than the United Kingdom itself, but 
maintained close ties with the British crown and acted in accordance with the Crown’s 
strategic policies until the Crown assumed control of the colonies in 1858.  Their 
aggressive infrastructure and administrative developments in India, supported by their 
military capabilities, benefited the Crown by expanding the Crown’s influence as well as 
befitting the average Englishman by providing Asian spices.  The Company was a well-
established and respected private company acting as a proxy government, with full legal 
authority to use violence, in the service of the United Kingdom. 
                                                 
34 George Landow, “The Company that Owned a Nation (or Two),” The Victorian Web, 
http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/victorian/history/empire/eic.html (accessed 31 July 2008). 
35 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003), 76. 
36 Barbara Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge Concise 
Histories), (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 56. 
37 C.A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (The New Cambridge History of 
India), (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 84-86. 
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F. SUMMARY  
This brief examination of the history of privatized warfare in the context of 
Western cultures suggests that negative public attitudes toward the practice of using 
private contractors in warfare may originate with experiences of the uncontrolled and 
unprofessional mercenaries who contributed to European misery during the Thirty Years 
War.  The more recent colonial American disdain for the Hessians fought for the British 
during the American Revolution, while perhaps undeserved, reinforces the bias against 
the use of private warriors.  On the other hand, high public regard for the Swiss Guard 
and the British East India Company suggests that the negative attitude toward private 
militaries is neither universal nor inevitable.  In the case of the Swiss Guard, the positive 
reputation depends on several factors, including the Guard's loyalty to a strong, 
responsible controlling authority and its long-term commitment to a consistent code of 
ethics and set of overarching moral principles for service.  The British East India 
Company’s success can be viewed as a self-sufficient and legitimate British proxy 
authority, in line with the Crown’s objectives and supporting the British economy.  Their 
actions were perceived to be in accordance with contemporary British values and ethics 
that propelled them to political and military legitimacy within the British population. 
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III. THE USE OF PMCS:  ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS  
Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is 
the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold 
blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that 
for sordid wages will march out… and help to slaughter strangers of his 
own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no 
quarrel…. And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood 
off his hands and works for “the universal brotherhood of man” - with his 
mouth. 38        — Mark Twain 
Secretary of State Casper Weinberger laid out general rules for using military 
force in a speech to the National Press Club in 1984.  This framework, the Weinberger 
Doctrine, although it is not always followed, is still considered the litmus test for 
deploying the military. The Weinberger Doctrine includes the following prescriptions. 
a) …the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless 
the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national 
interests or that of our allies. 
b) …if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, 
we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. 
c) …if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have 
clearly defined political and military objectives.  And we should know 
precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.  
And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. 
d) …the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have 
committed – their size, composition and disposition – must be continually 
reassessed and adjusted if necessary. 
e) …before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some 
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American People and 
their elected representatives in Congress. 
f) …the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. 39 
                                                 
38 Mark Twain, from What Is Man?, available from  http://www.twainquotes.com/War.html (accessed 
April 7, 2008). 
39 Casper Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York, NY: 
Warner Books, 1990), 441-442. 
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These imperatives provide a foundation for U.S. political leaders' decisions about 
the use of military force.   Most important is the first requirement that an issue vital to the 
U.S. or its allies be at stake. It implies that the U.S. military should be jealously guarded; 
the lives of soldiers should not be squandered.  The Weinberger Doctrine also suggests 
that using the military implies confidence that the military can accomplish its assigned 
objectives.   
Weinberger's discussion of the mutual expectations of the American people and 
the military reflects the idea of a social contract between the people and the government. 
This chapter first discusses the idea of a social contract as it applies to the military and to 
PMCs, and then describes some specific ethical and legal considerations relevant to the 
employment of PMCs. 
A. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
The idea that the people have a social contract with government, which implies 
that the people and the government are responsible to one another, is embedded in the 
Declaration of Independence.  The social contract is a cornerstone of the American 
democratic system and a basic American value.  A social contract—both implied and 
explicit—between the military and the citizenry involves public expectations of the 
military and vice versa.  At the most general level, the public expects the military to win 
the nation’s wars, while the military expects public support.40  
However, the U.S. military not only defends the Constitution against foreign and 
domestic enemies—it also, ideally, represents what is right and good with the country, 
personifying selfless service and dedicated commitment to democratic values.  These 
values spring from the desire to protect individual liberties of "life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness" as described in the Declaration of Independence.  In other words, the U.S. 
military has both a practical and symbolic role in the social contract. 
                                                 
40 Shannon French, “Warrior Transitions: From Combat to Social Contract,” JSCOPE, United States 
Naval Academy, January 2005. 
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1. The Social Contract between the People and the Military 
The explicit social contract between the United States and its military is specified 
in the U.S. Code Title 10, where the military’s responsibilities are spelled out.  The U.S. 
military is expected to behave in an ethical and legal manner at all times and to represent 
America's democratic ideals when stationed abroad.  The subordination of the state's 
armed forces to civilian control and the internal policing mechanisms described in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) are designed for accountability and to insure 
that the military does a credible job representing the nation.41 Breaches of standards are 
prosecuted under the UCMJ.   
Americans also expect the military to do its job, to “close with the enemy by 
means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close 
combat and counterattack.”42  The current strength of the U.S. military is approximately 
2.2 million personnel, including National Guard and Reserve units.43 This represents less 
than one percent of the U.S. population.44  The force cap on the U.S. military limits the 
number of service members, regardless of the missions they are required to conduct, 
which raises problems for the military's ability to fulfill its end of the social contract.  
This is true only if the military is unwilling to concede the possibility that smaller forces 
can achieve large tasks.  The U.S. military’s conventional approach to warfare still 
downplays the accomplishments of small units, such as when 11 Special Forces A-Teams 
overthrew the Taliban in the initial invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. 
One solution for the low troop-to-task ratio is to use PMCs for tasks like site 
security, VIP protection, security force training and intelligence gathering.  The presence 
                                                 
41 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 
47 (1951).   
42 Field Manual (FM) 7-8: Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1992), 1-1. 
43 U.S. Department of Defense, Appropriations Bill, 2007, Report to the Committee on Appropriations 
to Accompany H.R.5631, June 16, 2006, 109th Cong., 2d sess., House of Representatives, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=wDAvUIh7TLAC&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=dod+personnel+end+str
ength+2006&source=web&ots=n0vYQonESS&sig=6zsd7HoNRoRbANNRPGBxECYhSD8&hl=en#PPA1
5,M1 (accessed May 24, 2008).  
44 U.S. Census Bureau, “The 2008 Statistical Abstract,” 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/index.html (accessed May 24, 2008).  
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of PMCs is becoming more integrated as a standard element in operations.45 The 
American public understands that outsourcing some functions to private corporations 
supports the military, and probably first visualizes the use of private companies for 
logistical support of overseas deployments. With U.S. engagement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, however, PMCs have become increasingly visible in a wider variety of 
roles, raising questions of the relationships among the private sector, the military, and the 
citizenry.  
2. The Social Contract with PMCs 
Governments traditionally have the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.46  
Changes to the accepted, legitimate relationship between citizens and the state, through 
the inappropriate use of force or the use of force by an illegitimate actor, challenge the 
status quo and open the door to exploitation.   The PMCs operate in a grey area between 
governments and private corporations.  Worldwide, some PMCs are becoming more like 
proxy forces, committed to the national goals and objectives of whatever country they 
serve.  Blackwater Worldwide, a PMC that dovetails its mission profile set and performs 
ancillary duties with the U.S. effort in Iraq, is the best example of a company moving 
toward the proxy force model. Others, like the British company Armor Group, have an 
international presence with satellite offices in multiple countries, but the crux of their 
decision to accept a contract is whether it is permissible with respect to their parent 
country.47     
Outsourcing core combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) mission 
sets that once were basic military tasks has proven cost-effective.  The American public 
implicitly trusts the government to correctly and judiciously outsource security on an “as 
needed” basis. The U.S. military echoes this sentiment, preferring to utilize U.S. soldiers, 
                                                 
45 On his most recent deployment in support of OIF, the author found that mission planning and daily 
briefs included the whereabouts and actions of various PMCs in the area, and his unit  coordinated with the 
PMCs and exchanged information with their employees. 
46 Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 216-217. 
47 Information based on author's discussion of the business model of Armor Group and U.S.-based 
PMCs like Blackwater with representatives of Armor Group in Iraq.   
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but recognizing that private companies can be force multipliers and allow for greater 
operational flexibility. However, in outsourcing core functions, the government 
relinquishes some control over those missions.48   
The general position on the use of PMCs in support of the U.S. military seems to 
be that as long as the mission is accomplished, and barring any international incident, the 
use of PMCs is acceptable. It is when the public witnesses privately owned businesses 
conducting military operations that the question of corporate transparency arises. In other 
words, public attention is drawn to PMC operations when they perceive a breach of the 
social contract. 
Whatever the circumstances, the military must meet logistical and support 
requirements to fulfill its mission.  Private corporations fill the gaps. For example, in 
Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990's, KBR assisted the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) and the 
Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and remains active in the area.49  Over time, private companies 
experience mission creep when the military's ability or desire to tackle every problem 
begins to wane. Free from the need to divert forces to CS and CSS operations, the 
military has more personnel to focus at the decisive points of a campaign.  In short, 
sometimes it makes sense to outsource a set of tasks to a contractor—but not all the time.   
The question becomes a matter of determining when, within the constraints of 
legitimacy established by the social contract, the government should employ PMCs.  
Three elements are relevant to determining if use of PMCs by the U.S. government is 
appropriate:  ethical standards and expectations, legal constraints and financial 
considerations.  The remainder of this chapter focuses on these elements, with emphasis 
on the first two.  Discussion of ethical standards and expectations relevant to state 
militaries and private companies and their employees is followed by a presentation of 
international and domestic legal considerations. The chapter concludes with a brief 
                                                 
48 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108. 
49 The author deployed to Bosnia with SFOR and to Kosovo with KFOR from 1997-1999;  KBR was 
active in both theaters.  
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overview of the contracting process (financial considerations are considered more 
extensively in later discussions of cost-benefit analysis). 
B. ETHICAL STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS  
The U.S. government’s decision to employ PMCs is a byproduct of the decision 
to employ military forces.  Ideally, a government employs its military arm, with the 
supporting military-industrial complex, to further political goals and protect national 
interests.  When state forces cannot complete the necessary tasks, the corporate world 
may provide a solution. 
The biggest difference between the U.S. military and corporate solution sets is the 
level of accountability of each to the employer, i.e., the state.  Accountability involves 
transparency to the public as well as the ability of the state to respond to infractions of the 
contract or breaches of the social contract by punishment or withholding benefits.  The 
line blurs when a private corporation is hired to conduct quasi-military operations 
traditionally performed by uniformed servicemen. Theoretically, PMCs are bound by the 
same ethical constraints on conduct as the military and their employees should act as if 
they are in the military.  However, PMCs are also expected to behave in an efficient 
manner to maximize corporate profits while reducing costs in accordance with corporate 
practices. 
The UCMJ governs the judicial punishment system for military personnel, and 
this set of rules and regulations extends to all personnel within the DoD: servicemen, 
civilian contractors, everyone on the official payroll.50  Private military contractors, 
however, are currently employed only by the DoS and thus are outside the DoD span of 
control.51  The U.S. placed all PMCs under the UCMJ as of October 2007, but this 
                                                 
50 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.5122, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c109:6:./temp/~c109cLL4aT:e310300 (accessed April 24, 2008). 
Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice), is amended by striking `war' and inserting `declared war or a contingency operation.'  
51 Andrews, interview. 
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provision has yet to be tested.52  To avoid prosecution, Blackwater deals with infractions 
by PMC personnel by immediately removing individuals from the operational area and 
terminating the individual's contract.  To date, no U.S. PMC contractor in the GWOT has 
been held accountable for unethical or illegal conduct that might result in incarceration if 
committed by a service member.   
Such differences in approaches to ethical violations make some sense in the 
context of the social contract. There is a difference between being an employee of the 
state and an employee of a private corporation, a difference that has much to do with the 
varying expectations of private vs. public employees.  
The volunteered military service member most likely enters the service out of a 
sense of duty and patriotism.53  Breaches of conduct are dealt with in a transparent way 
through judicial and non-judicial punishment. This requires that the military police its 
own ranks in order to maintain the trust and credibility it has with the American public, to 
whom they must answer.   
In contrast, a private military employee most likely signs his contract primarily 
for economic reasons: for similar work, he receives better pay than a military 
counterpart.54  The actions of PMCs are contract based, meaning that individuals are 
financially compensated for their services over a finite period of time.  The employees of 
PMCs sell their services without the requirement that an “ethical tag-line” be attached to 
their operations.  And as private businesses, PMCs are not in the express business of 
killing, although it is understood that they have the right to self-defense.55   
                                                 
52 C.J. Chivers, “Supplier Under Scrutiny on Arms for Afghans,” New York Times, March 27, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/world/asia/27ammo.html?pagewanted=1&ref=asia%3Cbr%20/%3E 
(accessed March 30, 2008). Government contractors are held to criminal litigation when defrauding the 
government, as currently seen in AEY Inc.’s falsification of ammunition standards, but have not been 
prosecuted for actions committed in declared combat zones.  
53 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Boston: Bay Back Books, 1996), 89-90. 
54 For example, current PMC employees in OIF earn, on average, $600 per day, while an E-5 with six 
years' active duty earns approximately $115 per day.  This is considered in more depth in the discussion of 
Cost Benefit Analysis in Chapter V. 
55 U.S. Department of Defense, “Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of 
Defense and the Department of State on Using USG Private Security Companies,” December 5, 2007, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Signed%20MOA%20Dec%205%202007.pdf (accessed May 24, 2008).  
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The U.S. government deploys the military recognizing that it represents the 
official flagpole of the country.  The government and the public expect service members 
to represent national ideals, values, and ethical standards.  While the practical matter of 
accomplishing the ends is ultimately important, the symbolic matter of how the military 
conducts itself to accomplish those ends is equally important.   
In contrast, the American public’s social contract with the PMCs is more focused 
on mission accomplishment. When outsourcing a PMC, the end product takes priority 
over the means.  Ethical concerns about employing a PMC are often addressed with a 
limited examination of the company’s track record in conducting itself ethically, its 
ability to complete the specified task, and the personal reputation of the CEO.   
This approach is increasingly subject to scrutiny. The blurry distinctions among 
military, paramilitary and civilian personnel make PMCs ethical environment 
increasingly unstable. Ethical challenges to PMCs are the result of military ethics rubbing 
up against business ethics in compressed and volatile environments.   
C. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
Current legal standards for employing the military rest on the theory of just war, 
jus ad bellum, and jus in bello. Domestic and international legitimacy in the decision to 
use force entails that a military response must be against an enemy with the motive, the 
ability, and an immanent threat to harm America or her allies.56  The U.S. government in 
reality employs the military to protect national assets or vital allies' assets for a spectrum 
of reasons that ranges from self-defense to anticipatory self-defense to preventative self-
defense. The Weinberger Doctrine, discussed above, clarifies the appropriate conditions 
for using force, specifying that force should be the last option for resolving conflict.  
George W. Bush’s controversial strategy of strategic preventative war under the 2006 
                                                 
56 Dan Webster, “The Caroline Case,” http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-
1842d.htm (accessed May 3, 2008).  The Caroline Case established the precedent that only a direct threat to 
the interests of the United States or her allies justifies deploying the military. 
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National Security Strategy of the United States justifies using force to “defend liberty and 
justice," claiming "these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”57 
As its standard of international legitimacy, the U.S. abides by the Charter of the 
United Nations (UN), Chapter VII, Articles 42 and 43, respecting the United Nations 
Security Council and its resolutions determining what kind of force can be used to 
maintain or restore international peace.58  
Congress has the authority to declare war, thereby legitimizing the domestic 
mobilization of the services for the national defense, but the President as Commander in 
Chief has authority to deploy the military under immanent threat through provisions of 
the War Powers Act of 1973.59  The War Powers Act allows rapid military deployment to 
undeclared conflict zones, but requires accounting to Congress through occasional 
reporting on the progress of hostilities. Strict scrutiny of legal justifications is intended to 
prevent illegal, sub-rosa conflicts and provide a high level of public accountability. 
The current legal paradigm for employing PMCs reflects unclear boundaries 
between government and private military forces. The international community officially 
banned mercenary forces through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and updates in 1977 
and 2005. The international community nonetheless uses PMCs for policy 
implementation due to the lack of international military forces and as a response to 
political complications in the United Nations.   
To send troops in response to international crisis, the normal procedure is for the 
members of the UN Security Council to vote on a UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR).  However, any one of the five standing members of the Security Council can 
veto such a measure.  For example, China, protecting its economic interests in Sudan, in 
                                                 
57 The White House, “The National Security Strategy,” Chapter II.A., March 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionII.html (accessed May 3, 2008).  
58 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter 7, Articles 42-43, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm (accessed May 3, 2008).  
59 Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, in The Declaration of Independence and The 
Constitution of the United States (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 65; War Powers Resolution, Public 
Law 93-148, Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President, 93rd Cong., H. 
J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm (accessed May 3, 
2008). 
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2006 vetoed the proposal that UNSCR send international troops to relieve the Darfur 
crisis.60  Using PMCs is a way for the international community to work around veto or 
other time-consuming political processes.   
The legal justification for using PMCs comes through Article 47 of Additional 
Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Third Geneva Convention (GCIII).  This article outlaws 
mercenaries but specifies that “supply contractors” are lawful, and does not differentiate 
between defense contractors and PMCs.61  The Article 47 definition of a mercenary has 
enough loopholes that one can effectively operate as a mercenary without risk of being 
charged in a court of law.  This effectively makes the UN’s legal authority impotent when 
attempting to prosecute mercenaries. 
The United States is not a signatory to Article 47 of Additional Protocol I, but the 
U.S. does have domestic laws prohibiting independent individual contributions for 
foreign aid. Historically, the Neutrality Act of 1794 was supposed to forbid U.S. citizens 
from engaging in foreign wars or interfering with sovereign countries, but did not 
dissuade intervention completely,62 as evidenced by the nineteenth century profiteering 
of William Walker in Nicaragua, Nathan Algren in Japan, and other independent 
operators who sought to enrich themselves selling military services.  The contemporary 
American attitude saw individual mercenaries as quintessential frontiersman expanding 
America’s influence, their actions condoned so long as they were not subversive and did 
not conflict with national diplomatic, economic or military objectives.63   
                                                 
60 “China-Sudan Trade Relations Complicate Darfur Crisis,” PBS Online News Hour, April 25, 2006, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur_04-25-06.html (accessed May 3, 2008).   
61 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Article 47 of Additional Protocol I (1977) to 
the 1949 Third Geneva Convention (GCIII), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm (accessed May 
24, 2008).  
62 The Free Dictionary, s.v. “Neutrality,” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Neutrality 
(accessed May 3, 2008).  
63 “Death for ‘War Dogs,’” Time, July 12, 1976, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914277-1,00.html (accessed May 3, 2008).  Daniel 
Gearhart was tried and executed in 1976 in Angola for advertising to hire mercenaries in an American 
newspaper and then conducting mercenary operations in Angola.  Dana Drenkowski had to repay the U.S. 
government all the money he earned as a mercenary in Qaddafi’s service against Chad in 1978. See also Al 
J. Venter, War Dogs: Fighting Other People’s Wars (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006), 217-222. 
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D. RECENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING PMCS  
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 set a standard for 
civilians employed under DoD contracts, allowing the U.S. to prosecute DoD civilian 
employees for crimes committed overseas if they would normally receive more than one 
year of incarceration if prosecuted.64  However, the act only applies to DoD personnel. 
Currently, PMCs are authorized to operate in MNF-I, as well as in other international 
venues, but they face increasing legal restrictions on their behavior in theater.  These 
legal boundaries frame the PMC’s actions.         
The FY2007 Defense Budget imposes increased accountability on all PMCs with 
a provision stating that anyone accompanying U.S. military forces into a conflict zone 
falls under the UCMJ.65  This blanket provision covers all civilians, including journalists 
and foreign contracted employees. The legality of provisions holding PMC personnel 
accountable for actions in a combat zone are as yet untested.  This legal standard conflicts 
with and overrides the policy in Iraq since June 2004, as specified in Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 17, which exempts civilian agencies that are  
(a) assigned to or under the command of the Force Commander or MNF 
contingent commanders, (b) subject to other command authority to aid, 
protect, complement or sustain the Force Commander, or (c) employed by 
a Sending State in support of or accompanying the MNF. 66 
However, the extent to which the U.S. government is willing to prosecute PMC 
transgressions is unclear. 
                                                 
64 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Public Law 106-523, Chapter 212, § 3261.a.1, 106th 
Cong., November 12, 2000, http://www.pubklaw.com/hi/pl106-523.pdf (accessed May 14, 2008).  
65 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. 
66 The Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 17, June 27, 2004, http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (accessed 
May 14, 2008).  
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E. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 
The current process for contracting PMCs falls under the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation.67  A U.S. government agency determines a need and decides whether or not 
the agency can fulfill that need itself.  If not, the then agency submits a Request for 
Proposal in the form of a Statement of Work.  The contract is up for open bidding, but if 
there are pressing time constraints or other requirements, the government can grant the 
contract to a single bidder. Contracts are awarded to the company that offers “the best 
value solution to the customer, not necessarily the lowest price.”68  A Contracting Officer 
then grants the contract to the company and appoints a Contracting Officer’s 
Representative to serve as the U.S. government’s representative.69  
F. SUMMARY 
The American military is a subset of the American population as a whole. As an 
institution, the military is subordinate to the U.S. government, which reflects the will of 
the people as expressed by elected officials.  Therefore, American standards of behavior 
influence the military's approach to waging the nation’s wars, which in turn influences 
the government's decisions on outsourcing military activities to private corporations. In 
other words, decisions about whether outsourcing to PMCs is appropriate must be seen in 
a larger context, which includes American political values and ethics, as well as domestic 
and international legal constraints.  The ethical expectations and legal status of PMCs are 
undergoing transition as these companies' increased visibility raises questions for the 
public and the military alike. The current issue regarding PMCs is how to best utilize 
them in support of national policy. 
 
                                                 
67 Federal Acquisition Regulation, March 2005, 
http://www.arnet.gov/far/reissue/FARvol1ForPaperOnly.pdf (accessed May 14, 2008).  
68 For a succinct explanation of how a contractor bids and wins a contract, see Brent Jorgensen, 
“Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Operations,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2005), 46.   
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
[The Executive Outcomes company] gave us this stability.  In a perfect 
world of course, we wouldn’t need an organization like EO, but I’d be 
loath to say that they’d have to go just because they’re mercenaries. 70 
General Ian Douglas, negotiator for the UN in Angola, 1994 
A. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES  
To provide a highly professional and confidential military advisory service to 
legitimate governments. 
To provide sound military and strategic advice. 
To provide the most professional military training packages currently available to 
armed forces, covering aspects related to sea, air, and land warfare. 
To provide peace keeping (persuasion) services. 
To provide advice to state armed forces on weapon and weapon platform 
selection. 
To provide para-military services.  
To provide a total apolitical service based on confidentiality, professionalism, and 
dedication. 71   
This is the mission statement of Executive Outcomes (EO).  The first of three case 
studies presented in this chapter, EO represents the category of private combat company, 
falling at the far end of the spectrum of private military companies.   
Executive Outcomes was formed in 1989 as a holding company for South 
African-based Strategic Resources Corporation under the direction of Eeben Barlow.  A 
retired lieutenant colonel, Barlow had served in the South African Defense Force's 
(SADF) reconnaissance 32 Battalion Recce Wing and in the secretive Civil Co-operation 
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Bureau (CCB). The SADF, CCB, and South African Special Forces were intensely 
involved in paramilitary counterinsurgency operations in Namibia, Angola, Rhodesia, 
and throughout southern Africa.72 
When South African apartheid began to unravel in the late 1980’s, the SADF, the 
parent organization of 32 Battalion, CCB, and Koevoet, came under government 
directives to disband.73  Barlow recognized the potential value of highly trained operators 
and recruited directly from the SADF into Executive Outcomes.74  In 1993, with the help 
of Tony Buckingham and Simon Man, Barlow registered EO as an official business in the 
United Kingdom. It became the prototypical private combat company.75 
At the company’s highpoint, Barlow said he could provide 500 military advisors 
and over 3,000 Special Forces soldiers.  Executive Outcomes had assets for African 
deployments that included Mi-24 Hind-Ds, Mi-8 Hips, BMP-2s, field artillery, a Boeing 
707 MEDEVAC plane, two Boeing 727s and armored personnel carriers.76  Their 
operations in Angola and Sierra Leone propelled them into the international spotlight; 
contracts with Texaco, DeBeers, and other private companies directly funded their 
operations.77   
Executive Outcomes is in some ways similar to the Hessians, with well-trained 
and equipped specialists bound by group loyalty to high professional standards. 
Executive Outcomes claim to have only accepted contracts for legal and ethical activities.  
The company declined a $100 million, one-time payment to help overthrow the Nigerian 
government in 1998 because of legal and ethical concerns.78  Executive Outcomes 
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officially disbanded when South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign National 
Military Assistance Act in 1998, but in the wake of the breakup, similar companies were 
established, including Sandline, Lifeguard and Saracen.79 
1. Angola 
In 1993, a civil war in Angola pitted the rebel National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the government's Angolan Armed Forces 
(FAA).  Chinese-sponsored UNITA intended to gain political power by seizing oil 
refineries at Soyo and expanding to other international businesses in Angola.80  The FAA 
failed to repel the assault on the refineries, and the government contracted with EO in 
September 1993 to reclaim Soyo and train FAA troops in security operations.81  The link 
between the FAA and EO was through Buckingham, who also owned one of the oil 
companies.82  Buckingham asked Barlow how much it would cost to reclaim Soyo, to 
which Barlow cavalierly answered $10 million.  Much to Barlow’s surprise, Buckingham 
agreed.83  Executive Outcomes entered Angola with 80 men and quickly secured Soyo 
and the industrial sites without casualties, demonstrating their competence to the 
government and international investors.84   
The Angolan government offered a second contract to train the FAA and conduct 
front-line operations, which they paid for with $40 million in money and oil 
concessions.85  A 500-man EO force reestablished the FAA's 16th BDE, trained 5,000 
soldiers and 30 pilots and conducted operations to drive UNITA from the capital and to 
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the negotiating table.86  A campaign plan of deep-penetration, air-ground assaults and 
night attacks targeting UNITA leadership and force concentrations crippled the rebels 
and forced them to accept the Lusaka Protocol in October, 1994.87  The Lusaka Protocol 
fell apart three years later, but in bolstering the FAA, expelling UNITA from the capital, 
and introducing relative tranquility, EO successfully completed the terms of their 
contract. The Angolan state appeared stable, with a trained army capable of controlling 
UNITA remnants. When EO redeployed from Angola in January 1995, an advance party 
travelled from Angola to Sierra Leone for a contract with the newly established Sierra 
Leone military junta.88 
2. Sierra Leone 
In August 1992, military coup plotters in Sierra Leone assumed control of the 
government from President Joseph Saidu Momoh.  The newly formed government, called 
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), had ousted Momoh for corruption, 
making Captain Valentine Strasser the head of state.89  The NPRC was as ineffective as 
Momoh’s administration, which fueled domestic opposition.90  The Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), under Sankoh, received direct aid from Liberian President Charles Taylor; 
the purpose was to seize Freetown, overthrow the NPRC, and gain control of the diamond 
mines.91  The UN refused to intervene because France threatened to veto any resolution 
to send forces. The French position has been attributed to post-colonial resentment of the 
formerly British Sierra Leone in what had been mostly French West Africa.92  The UN 
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Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was ineffective and lacked teeth, so Strasser’s 
administration hired EO in April 1995.  The initial contract for $15 million stated that EO 
must complete four tasks:   
1. Secure Freetown 
2. Regain control of the country’s diamond fields and Rutile mine, thereby 
allowing the government to generate revenue and help guarantee EO 
payment 
3. Destroy the RUF’s headquarters 
4. Clear remaining areas of RUF occupation93 
The final price for EO was somewhere between $35 and $60 million, 
considerably less than UNAMSIL’s cost of $607 million per year.94   
Poor infrastructure in Sierra Leone led EO to focus on air movement with their 
subsidiary company, Ibis Air.95 They brought in 160 employees to fight 15,000 RUF 
“sobels.”96  When EO arrived, the government gave them uniforms and small arms 
equivalent to the Royal Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF).97  Executive Outcomes 
quickly pushed the RUF away from Freetown with a combined arms approach of indirect 
fire, air support and aggressive tactical maneuverings.  The EO soldiers, with their SADF 
backgrounds, were experts in counter guerrilla operations. They overwhelmed the 
inexperienced, and often marijuana-inebriated, RUF forces and drove them out of 
Freetown.98   
In August 1995 the government offered EO a second contract to completely 
destroy the RUF for $35 million payable in cash and diamond mine concessions. This 
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amounted to a third of the annual RSLMF budget.99  The contract specified that EO 
would bear the brunt of operational planning and mission accomplishment with 
helicopters, and would instruct the RSLMF in basic fire-and-maneuver tactics.100 The 
RSLMF outnumbered the RUF by three to one, but they were operationally ineffective 
and lacked basic soldier skills.101  The original campaign plan estimated a three month 
operation, but it took only nine days to drive the RUF 126 kilometers into the jungle and 
into Liberia.102  Executive Outcomes used an extensive intelligence network supported 
by international connections for strategic situational awareness, as well as accurate aerial 
reconnaissance and local Kamajors reports for operational and tactical planning.103  
Helicopters allowed EO to transverse the dense jungle quickly to conduct deep strikes 
against the underprepared RUF.104  The RUF’s defeat forced them to a negotiated 
settlement with the NPRC for a multiparty civilian presidential election in February, 
1996.  Sierra Leonean citizens cheered EO for bringing peace to the country, although the 
respite was short-lived.105 Executive Outcomes departed and stability operations were 
transitioned to the UN force, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG).  After the transition, the RUF repudiated the peace treaty and 
resumed the conflict, a development that EO had predicted.106  Sierra Leone devolved 
into chaos, with the RUF making extensive use of conscripted child soldiers to reclaim 
power.  Eventually, the RUF shared political power with the government. 
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B. MPRI 
MPRI's mission is to focus the experience, expertise and values of our 
workforce to develop and implement comprehensive, imaginative 
programs that build security, justice and well being within the United 
States and around the world.  We serve the national security needs of the 
U.S. government, selected foreign governments, international 
organizations and the private sector with programs of the highest standards 
and methodologies of proven effectiveness.107  
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), whose mission statement is 
quoted here, was formed in 1987 when eight retired general officers formed a military 
advising company as that Cold War waned and the DoD began to downsize.108  In this 
thesis, MPRI represents a proxy military company, closely aligned and with strong 
allegiance to the U.S.  
All but a few of MPRI’s employees are ex-U.S. Army personnel.109 The company 
maintains a database of over 9,000 retired officers and non-commissioned officers 
available for contracts.110  Retired General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army 
during Operation Desert Storm, became the MPRI chairman in 1992, and claims former 
senior level commanders and sergeants major as board members and employees.111  
Close personal ties to the Pentagon and the Clinton administrations increased MPRI’s 
credibility.  Retired General Colin Powell calls Vuono a close personal friend, and senior 
MPRI members maintain connections with the Pentagon and their former superiors and 
subordinates.112   
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Like the Swiss Guard, and consistent with its "proxy" nature, MPRI has assumed 
a supporting role to the military.113  The U.S. government has contracts with MPRI to 
recruit for ROTC and to develop and publish field manuals on contracting support and 
contractors on the battlefield.114  The company states that its main focus is on a strong 
national defense and public security, although its employees are not permitted to bear 
arms.115  MPRI claims to have at least 3,000 employees in 40 countries with over $2 
billon in company revenues in 2005.116   
1. Croatia 
As the Former Republic of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, Serbian military 
forces entered Croatia and Bosnia in 1991 to reclaim what they considered Serbian land.  
The Serbian paramilitary and military forces began a campaign of ethnic cleansing to 
ensure Serbian blood purity.117  The international community demanded action against 
the mass displacement of Croatian and Bosnian refugees but failed to galvanize much 
support until 1994.  The “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia in October 1993 
significantly decreased U.S. willingness to engage problems with military options, 
according Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.118  The Clinton 
administration’s foreign policy shifted to favor political resolutions over military 
solutions.119   
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Croatian Defense Minister Susak requested U.S. military assistance from 
Secretary of Defense William Perry, but Perry’s hands were tied by UN Security Council 
Resolution 713, commonly referred to as the UN Arms Embargo, which prohibited direct 
U.S. military assistance.120  Perry, a close personal friend of Vuono, recommended MPRI 
to Susak, who offered the Drina Mission contract paying $140 million for 45 military 
advisors to assist against Serbian incursions into Croatia, $40 million for MPRI-led 
training and $100 million for a surplus arms transfer program.121  Even today, MPRI 
categorically denies holding this contract, leading to continued confusion about the 
source of the surplus arms.   
The 1994 Drina River Mission with Croatia sought to block Bosnian and Krajina 
Serbs from entering Croatia and to push them back into Serbia.  The contract effectively 
bypassed UNSCR 713, and gave the U.S. government limited access into Croatia through 
MPRI’s reports and updates.  The contract also required that Croatia to give NATO 
forces safe passage to Bosnia once the political situation allowed.122 
The Drina Mission Contract required 45 MPRI advisory personnel to do two 
things: 1) provide long-range management training to restructure the Croatian Defense 
Department and 2) provide military training and education to democratize to the Croatian 
armed forces, Hrvatska Vojska (HV).123  The advisors program began in April 1995 and 
culminated in August, when the HV launched an offensive into to reclaim Serb controlled 
Krajina.  The HV forces recouped all but four percent of the previously controlled area 
and up to 20 percent of Bosnian lands.124   
The previously ineffective HV’s OPERATION STORM resembled the U.S. new 
doctrine, AirLand Battle 2000, with carefully synchronized armored, mechanized and air 
assets.  The Bosnian Serbs were driven east and locked outside of established Croatian 
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borders while the HV linked up with Bosnian Muslims.125  The Serbian forces withdrew 
from Krajina after four days of fighting, and Serbian President Milosevic agreed to 
negotiate with the UN coalition governments in the Dayton Peace Accords in November 
1995.126 The Croatian proficiency level increased, as indicated by withdrawal of Serbian 
forces and decreased Serbian attacks. The Serbian forces encountered more effective 
resistance under the MPRI-advised forces and reconsidered plans for a large-scale 
offensive push into Croatia to regain lost ground.  According to UN opinion, MPRI was 
decisive in professionalizing the HV and their subsequent success in ejecting the Serbian 
forces from Krajina.127 
Although MPRI continues to deny involvement with the HV, the change in 
Croatian capabilities and their use of NATO-adopted doctrine after the Drina Mission 
Contract imply heavy U.S. influence.  MPRI spokesman and retired Lt. General Soyster 
claims that the U.S. government is "using us to carry out American foreign policy.  We 
certainly don’t determine foreign policy, but we can be part of the U.S. government 
executing foreign policy.”128  General Clark cited the Croatian action as “a turning point” 
that forced Serbia to the peace talks and let UN forces to enter Bosnia through Croatia to 
establish the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to halt the Serbian ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnia.129 The Dayton Peace Accords led to the War Crimes Tribunal for 
Serbian leaders and the transition of IFOR to the current Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 
the Balkans.  MPRI maintains offices in Sarajevo and a small presence throughout the 
Balkans.130 
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C. BLACKWATER 
Blackwater Worldwide efficiently and effectively integrates a wide range 
of resources and core competencies to provide unique and timely solutions 
that exceed our customers stated need and expectations. Guided by 
integrity, innovation, and a desire for a safer world, Blackwater 
Worldwide professionals leverage state-of-the-art training facilities, 
professional program management teams, and innovative 
manufacturing/production capabilities to deliver world- class customer 
driven solutions. 131          
In 1997 former Navy SEALs Erik Prince and Al Clark formed Blackwater under 
the umbrella of the Prince Group.  Now a group of nine companies, Blackwater 
epitomizes the all-purpose private military company. 
Blackwater was originally established to provide advanced training to U.S. 
military forces.132 (Blackwater Worldwide's mission statement is cited above.) 
Employees at the Blackwater compound in Moynock, NC, soon began training 
employees of other federal agencies and law enforcement units, including the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Blackwater 
offers law enforcement units realistic and adaptable training.133  Reactions to incidents 
like the Columbine shooting, 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina propelled Blackwater to the 
forefront in domestic training. The company mission morphed in 2000, when ex-CIA 
agent Jamie Smith proposed forming Blackwater Security Company (BSC).  Although 
initially skeptical, Prince supported the idea after recognizing market needs, and modeled 
BSC after EO.134  Blackwater Security Company became the “face” of Blackwater 
Worldwide.   
The size of BSC, only one of the nine Blackwater companies, is unpublished, but 
estimates claim it employs about a thousand “shooters” and has a database of 21,000 
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personnel.135 Shooters are the employees on the ground executing the assigned tasks.   
The Blackwater Academy at Moynock qualifies approximately 30,000 shooters each year 
in personal security and military operations. Conservative estimates assign three support 
and logistic personnel for every shooter.136  Blackwater Worldwide vice-chair Cofer 
Black claims that BSC can provide a brigade-size force for security and peace operations 
at any time.137   
 
Figure 2.   Blackwater Organization Chart138 
1. Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom 
Blackwater Security Company was awarded the first PMC contract of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The contract, to provide 20 armed guards at the Kabul 
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CIA station for six months, was worth $5.4 million.139  Shooters were paid $550 per day, 
but Blackwater billed the U.S. government $1500 per shooter per day to cover overhead 
and establish a profit margin.140  According to Blackwater, there were no breaches of 
security while they guarded the CIA outstation.141  However, the DoS did not renew the 
contract; the official statement was that Blackwater could not to fully staff all 
requirements.  Blackwater claims there was a conflict with the Executive Director of the 
CIA, “Buzzy” Krongard. Krongard would work for Blackwater once he retired from 
federal service.142  Krongard’s addition to Blackwater’s ranks tightened the connections 
between the company and the federal executive branch. 
2. Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom  
Paul Bremer became the Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
to Iraq in May 2003. As head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Ambassador 
Bremer reported to the Secretary of Defense, but the DoS was responsible for personal 
security.  After a survey, the U.S. Secret Service determined that the mission was too 
dangerous and turned it down, allowing Blackwater to accept a “sole source” no-bid 
contract in August.143 The $27.7 million contract required a personal security detachment 
(PSD) for Bremer with two helicopters; it was expanded to include armored vehicles, K-9 
teams, and a CASA-212 airplane.144  Given Bremer’s status and the $45 million bounty 
on his head, Blackwater adopted an aggressive posture in protecting him, driving Iraqis 
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off the road and forcibly establishing a defensive perimeter at all times.145  Their tactics 
kept threats from closing in on Bremer, but also turned Iraqi public opinion against PSD 
elements.146   
All of the PSD contracts for OIF eventually fell under a contract with Worldwide 
Personal Protective Services (WPPS) that includes Blackwater, Triple Canopy, Inc., and 
DynCorp.147  The contract states that Blackwater must provide “protection of U.S. and/or 
certain foreign government high-level officials when the need arises” for an indefinite 
period of time.148  The contract was initially for $332 million for each of the three PMCs. 
It expanded to $488 million by July 2006 and paid for 482 personnel to staff 
Blackwater’s mission.149  The DoS extended the contract (WPPS II) in May 2006, 
increasing the authorized personnel to 1,020 and the contract value to $1.2 billion per 
contracting company.150 
The killing of four Blackwater employees on 30 March 2004 by Sunni insurgents 
in Fallujah impacted the company, MNF-I, and the entire PMC community, largely 
because it was videotaped and aired by Al Jazeera television.151  Four Blackwater 
employees were subcontracted for Eurest Support Services (ESS) through KBR and 
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assigned route reconnaissance through Fallujah.152  The Sunni insurgents mistakenly 
identified the heavily armored Western civilians as CIA agents and ambushed them, 
filming the event.  The gruesome pictures of burned Americans hanging from the 
Fallujah River bridge increased Western diplomats' fears and PMC rates skyrocketed.  
Blackwater’s PSD billing rate rose, to as much as $2,000 per day per shooter.153 The 
event also introduced the term “private contractor” into the American vernacular.154   
The DoS contracts continued requiring Blackwater to protect the Coalition 
Provisional Authority's hard structures, virtual mini-embassies scattered throughout Iraq.  
Blackwater defended the CPA in Najaf during the Shi’a uprising under Moqtada al Sadr 
in August 2004.  Eight Blackwater guards fought alongside four Marines against the 
insurgents for a day, successfully defending the CPA.155 The U.S. military could not 
reach the CPA to assist in the evacuation so Blackwater’s MD-530 Little Bird helicopters 
MEDEVACed the wounded Marines to safety.156  Blackwater personnel’s actions in 
battle increased their credibility and the perception that the company would meet its 
security contracts regardless of physical dangers. 
Blackwater’s forceful tactics have produced a perfect track record for protective 
services.  To date, Blackwater Worldwide has conducted over 16,000 PSD operations, 
losing ten employees in Iraq and three in Afghanistan, but without losing a protected 
principal in either theater.157  Blackwater has a record of contract accomplishment, but 
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their public relations suffer from widespread dismay over their use of aggressive 
techniques, tactics, and procedures that have resulted in Iraqi civilian deaths.  
Blackwater's strong-arm tactics essentially mean that they accept Iraqi civilian deaths as a 
price of insuring their principals' security.158  Consider only two of many cases in which 
Blackwater stands accused of inappropriate, reckless or unethical behavior. In June 2005, 
Blackwater guards killed an unarmed Iraqi man on the side of the road in al-Hillah. The 
company paid his family $5,000 in restitution.159  In September 2007, 17 Iraqis were 
killed in Baghdad's Nisoor Square.160  Blackwater claims that they were under direct fire 
and evasively withdrew.  Iraqis state that company operators fired indiscriminately on 
innocent civilians.161   
No private security personnel have ever been held legally accountable for 
wrongful deaths.  Bremer’s Order 17 removed any responsibility for PMC actions 
between 2003 and the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act’s inclusion of PMCs under the 
UCMJ.  Since then, Blackwater removed accused individuals from the theatre as soon as 
an incident occurs and terminates the individual's contract to avert prosecution.162  U.S. 
troops can be recalled to active duty for courts martial proceedings, but Order 17, 
combined with the termination of individual contracts, removes any culpability for PMC 
employees. 
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Private military companies like Blackwater have published contracts with non-
DoD agencies like DoS and DHS.163 The DoD does not outsource operational security 
contracts to PMCs, but it does use some PMCs domestically for training purposes.164  
Cooperation between DoD and PMCs continues to increase.165  Meanwhile, BSC and 
Blackwater Worldwide are expanding into research and development on how to provide 
better protection to their assigned principals and secure future contracts.166   
D. SUMMARY 
The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recognizes contractors as an 
integral part of the modern battlefield and includes them in operational planning by 
explicitly stating they are part of the total force.167  This cooperation is further codified 
for operations in Iraq in a 5 December 2007 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
between the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State.168  U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 
Ryan Crocker, testified to the Senate, "There is simply no way at all that the State 
Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security could ever have enough full-time personnel 
to staff the security function in Iraq. There is no alternative except through contracts."169  
Current legislative proposals seek to further legitimize PMCs like Blackwater abroad and 
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will be submitted with the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act.170  The DoD continues to 
discourage the use of contractors in roles that could involve combat.171 
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V. ANALYSIS 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist. 172  —President Eisenhower 
Executive Outcomes, MPRI and Blackwater are all PMCs that operate to support 
a state's efforts to accomplish national objectives.  Their actions affect the immediate 
situation and shape the operational battlefield.  Executive Outcomes is classified as a 
private combat company insofar as it conducted offensive operations alongside 
government armed forces, targeting and engaging enemies of the state.  In the Balkans, 
MPRI was as a proxy military company because it acted directly on behalf of the U.S. 
government when the U.S. government could not act itself.  MPRI did not directly 
engage the Serbian forces and fulfilled its contract as if it represented the U.S. 
government.  Blackwater can be classified as a general-purpose PMC in Iraq, performing 
as a proxy military company as well as a private security company, while maintaining the 
option of “aggressive” defensive operations.  In this chapter, all three are examined in 
light of the evaluation criteria identified in Chapter I:  competence, cost-benefit analysis, 
control, flexibility, and impact on state military forces. 
A. COMPETENCE 
All three case studies involve PMCs that accomplished the terms of their contracts 
and were competent.  The only questionable case involves a dispute over whether 
Blackwater fulfilled part of the contract to guard the CIA-Kabul outstation in 2002.  The 
overall competence level displayed by EO, MPRI, and Blackwater is exceedingly high.  
Although not all PMCs are so competent, the case studies indicate that PMCs can operate 
at high performance levels in challenging situations.  All three companies recruited  
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qualified and experienced personnel from their military forces, developed the capability 
to project forces and military strength, and maintained the resolve to complete their 
assigned tasks. 
In the case of EO, the dissolution of the SADF gave Barlow unprecedented access 
to soldiers experienced in counter guerrilla warfare with already-established trust and 
confidence in one other.  Through their subsidiary Ibis Air, EO also had ample aircraft 
support that let them bypass the substandard roads and produce lightning-fast attacks on 
UNITA and RUF forces.  The professionalism of the EO soldiers who trained indigenous 
forces, coupled with their all-around military competence, helped EO quickly and 
efficiently eliminate the threats in Angola and Sierra Leone. Executive Outcomes' 
operational and tactical capabilities were particularly obvious in contrast with the 
unprofessionalism and incompetence of their opposition, and especially the RUF. Its 
performance gave EO international recognition and heralded the arrival of the modern 
PMC. 
As with EO, MPRI emerged from a reduction in military force, in this case when 
the U.S. DoD began to downsize in 1987.  The senior military retirees who founded the 
company made their experience and judgment available to the U.S. government.  The 
competence of MPRI was demonstrated when they received contracts to define DoD-
contractor relations in two field manuals.  With an extensive network and database, 
MPRI can capitalize on the pool of trained military professionals, choosing appropriate 
personnel to fit their contracts, as in the Drina River contract.  The company transformed 
the Soviet-style HV military into a NATO-style force incorporating the U.S. combined 
arms AirLand 2000 doctrine.  The result was an overwhelming victory over the Krajina 
Serbs and the Serbian military that, when combined with NATO’s and other international 
efforts, paved the way for the Dayton Peace Accords.  MPRI’s official denial of any 
involvement only raises more doubts about how the HV, without Western assistance, 
could have possibly accomplished such a dramatic turnaround so quickly.  Numerous 
unofficial MPRI sources and reports point to the effectiveness of MPRI’s work with the 
HV staff and soldier-level training plans. 
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Blackwater’s subsidiary company, BSC, has proven competent despite recent 
allegations of human rights violations and overly aggressive tactics.  Recent cases of BSC 
misusing authorized violence illustrates that they are highly competent in military affairs 
but their actions can detract from the overall effectiveness of the mission.  They have 
protected the personal security of their designated principals, thereby increasing their 
value as a security provider.  Blackwater maintains an active database similar to MPRI's 
and can select personnel by matching individual skills to mission requirements.  They 
have also been very successful in recruiting SOF soldiers through personal connections.  
The U.S. Special Operations Command identifies loss of qualified personnel to security 
companies as a problem in maintaining its strength.173  Blackwater’s personnel screening, 
training regimen, and small unit structure produce effective and competent security for 
individuals, infrastructure and transportation convoys.174  Fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 
as well as armored vehicles, insure that Blackwater will be at the cutting edge of PMCs 
conducting privatized security, regardless of public relations failures. 
To successfully fulfill contract requirements, PMCs combine research and 
development, personnel selection and comprehensive training. Private military company 
competence will increase as a result of their experience.  Market forces also play a role.  
The more competent PMCs will secure more and better contracts and attract more 
candidates with SOF-type backgrounds through personal networks and financial 
incentives.175  
B. COST EFFICENCY ANALYSIS 
In assessing PMCs, the relevant cost efficiency analysis focuses on cost 
effectiveness.  This metric considers on the cost of operations, as well as the costs of 
recruiting, training, employing, sustaining and redeploying forces.  A state should 
calculate the financial costs of using a PMC in comparison to the cost of using state 
armed forces for the same task. 
                                                 
173 Elsea and Serafino, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq,” 26. 
174 Ibid., 2. 
175 Scahill, Blackwater, 83-84. 
 50
In the case studies, EO’s employment in both Angola and Sierra Leone was very 
cost efficient for the African governments.  The Angolan contracts cost the country $50 
million over the course of one year.  Regaining the diamond mines generated over $100 
million annually for Angola.176  The Angolan army, the FAA, was in no shape to repel 
UNITA attacks, and the international business community demanded a quick solution 
regardless of whether the international political community offered cooperation.  
Executive Outcomes reduced the UNITA threat and also trained the FAA in Western-
style tactics and basic aviation competencies.  The Sierra Leone contracts were also 
extremely cost efficient for the government.  At $35 million, EO’s contract was only one-
third of the RSMLF’s annual budget.177  The NPRC government could not rely on its 
armed forces, despite their numerical superiority, and UNAMSIL’s comparative cost was 
17 times more expensive at $607 million.  Executive Outcomes had the most cost-
effective solution for the NPRC.  Criticized for practicing “predatory capitalism” on 
failing states, EO provided cost-effective service to both Angola and Sierra Leone. 178 
In Croatia, MPRI’s cost for the Drina River Mission totaled $140 million for 
weapons and equipment.  The UN restrictions on direct NATO involvement limited the 
Croatian Minister of Defense’s military options.  Bypassing the Croatian parliament, he 
established a direct relationship with the U.S. Secretary of Defense who, in turn, 
recommended MPRI.  Their training and equipment allowed transformation of the HV, 
which then soundly defeated the Serbian forces. The liberation of Krajina and subsequent 
NATO-led IFOR and SFOR missions made MPRI’s contract very cost efficient.  The 
Bosnian Prime Minister stated that MPRI was “the next best thing” to U.S. assistance.179 
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In a six-year period, between FY2000 and the third quarter of FY2007, 
Blackwater Worldwide secured $1.02 billion dollars in U.S. government contracts.180  
The company earned $593 million in FY2006, including $335 million from security 
contracts. 181  In the same year, BSC was awarded $146.5 million. 182  The DoD’s budget 
was that year was $470.2 billion.183  In 2006, the U.S. government spent $212,000 per 
soldier.184 In contrast, it spent $1.2 million per Blackwater security contractor based on 
365 days of service in a combat zone.185  
These calculations do not include the significant start-up costs of soldier training. 
Such costs are not born by Blackwater, which employs already-trained former service 
members. But at the individual level, a soldier observes the contractor getting paid four to 
nine times as much as the soldier for performing the same duty, in the same location, and 
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"[M]y personal concern about some of these security contracts is that I worry that 
sometimes the salaries that they are able to pay in fact lure some of our soldiers out of the 
service to go to work for them."187   
The contracts of EO and MPRI were cost effective in that they offered a military 
solution at a reasonable price.  Blackwater’s current contract inflates the market, and 
every other PMC, citing the market trends, can raise their price.  The cost effectiveness of 
PMCs is currently lower when compared to DoD forces.  Post 9/11 threats against high-
level government officials and the inflated price of privatized security have increased the 
cost of employing PMCs.  The $3.6 billion WPPS I and II contracts, with $1.2 billion 
going to each of three companies, is staggering compared with Blackwater’s FY2006 bill 
of $335 million for the same job. Assuming that government-employed soldiers and 
private security contractors have equal training and competence, PMCs like Blackwater 
are not more cost effective than DoD for security operations. 
C. FLEXIBILITY 
The criterion of flexibility is the PMC’s ability to change rapidly to meet mission 
circumstances and their overall agility and versatility in contract selection.  PMCs offer 
governments a ready solution to a military problem.  Their contracts must fall within the 
domain of what the company is designed to do, but may also need to be adapted to fit the 
employer's specific needs. 
In executing their African contracts, EO was extremely flexible.  In Angola, EO 
incorporated deep penetration strikes, aerial reconnaissance and fire support, for the first 
time conducting night strikes with night vision devices.188  They had a flexible response 
to a changing threat.  Their ability to deploy an advance party to Sierra Leone even as 
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they withdrew from Angola required great organizational flexibility.  The Angola and 
Sierra Leone missions were quite different. The advance party in Sierra Leone quickly 
recognized that the lack of roads dictated aerial movements, and the manning 
requirement for Sierra Leone was reduced from 500 to 160.  In matters such as training 
the Kamajors and RSLMF, utilizing radio intercepts and signal intelligence, and 
maximizing their aerial platforms, EO demonstrated their tactical and operational 
flexibility. 
In Croatia, MPRI’s performance demonstrates neither flexibility nor inflexibility.  
They completed their contract as identified by the Croatian Minister of Defense. MPRI’s 
completion of two U.S. field manuals and their role advising and instructing the HV force 
illustrates the breadth of their expertise, but it is not relevant to tactical or operational 
flexibility.   
Blackwater’s record exemplifies PMC flexibility insofar as the organization is 
adept at recognizing market needs and providing workable solutions.  Often, Blackwater 
will accept a contract and then structure a solution set to fulfill the contract, as in the 
example of Bremer’s PSD.  Blackwater's use of aerial support and its focus on research 
and development further distinguishes them from other PMCs; these elements allow 
Blackwater to accept a larger number and greater diversity of contracts.  In conducting 
PSD duties, Blackwater maintains multiple options for transporting and securing their 
principals. Blackwater is extremely effective when it comes to providing contracting 
authorities with a solutions and delivering on their contracts. 
D. CONTROL 
Control refers to the amount of direct influence the government exerts over 
PMCs, as well as the state's ability to hold a PMC legally liable for its actions.  State 
armed forces are directly accountable to the government.  The U.S. military is 
subordinate to the U.S. government under UCMJ and the U.S. Code through an 
established chain of command.  In contrast, PMCs are private companies and, apart from 
the ordinary expectations of lawful behavior that apply to any private company, are not 
obligated to take orders from government officials. 
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Control of EO by both the Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments was 
marginal, and EO's level of accountability to the South African government was non-
existent.  No one had the ability to control EO or effectively monitor their operations.  
They had complete freedom of maneuver, both politically and operationally, and were 
trusted to use force judiciously.  Their SADF core and their internal social network 
allowed the force to regulate itself to a large degree, but they were not subject to an 
external governing body that might impose judicial punishments.  There are many 
accusations that EO allowed human rights violations because responding to human rights 
abuses was not part of their contract. 189  In fulfilling their contract, EO's conduct was not 
subject to legal control by any government.  
The MPRI company maintains strict internal accountability through close 
personal relationships.  Board members maintain strong DoD ties so the company can 
operate as an extension of U.S. policy; it is important that MPRI control itself and its 
members as if they were active duty military.  Like EO, MPRI regulates itself, and this is 
often good enough.  However, during their Drina River Mission, MPRI had no external 
oversight of how they trained and advised the HV forces.  The HV displaced between 
150,000 and 200,000 ethnic Serbs in reclaiming Krajina and the surrounding area, 
committing the largest ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslavian War.190  Although denying 
involvement, MPRI advisors would have seen or at least been aware of Croats killing 
noncombatant Serbs.  The company did not control the HV and their own actions have 
not been questioned, although they may have tacitly condoned human rights violations by 
HV forces. 
Blackwater has come under increased scrutiny; their aggressive tactics and 
growing prices raise questions.  BSC performs like a military unit.  Like EO and MPRI, 
Blackwater relies on the military values and professionalism of its employees. 
Employees' continued adherence to military ethics and values is assumed, but cannot be 
mandated.  The Blackwater Academy trains prospective contractors as a control measure.  
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However, not all Blackwater employees share the same moral, legal and ethical 
understandings.  Human rights violations and wrongful death suits create negative 
publicity for the company.   
The FY2007 and FY2008 Defense Authorization Acts seek to reign in all PMCs 
and make them more accountable for actions.  The U.S. government is making a effort, 
through dialogue and legislation, to manage PMCs and hold them directly accountable, 
searching for ways to control PMCs without limiting their effectiveness. 
Private military companies operate in the gap between military capabilities and 
private business regulations.  Their military potential is high; how well they can be 
controlled depends on legislation.  The U.S. government, like any state employer, must 
have a high degree of trust and confidence in the PMC.  Trust and confidence is usually 
expressed by close personal relationships among members of the organizations.  
Unfortunately, the lack of control and oversight allows PMCs to be linked to human 
rights violations by their actions or their failures to act. Human rights concerns affect the 
PMCs’ reputations and future contracts.  As noted in Chapter III, the state’s legitimacy 
also comes into question when PMCs behave contrary to core national values.  In the 
future, to protect their own legitimacy, states may seek to grant contracts only to 
companies that, in performing the practical tasks called for by the contract, also represent 
and exemplify the positive values of the state, consistent with national ideals.  
E. IMPACT ON STATE ARMED FORCES 
The impact of PMCs on state armed forces is the most political and strategic 
criterion for assessment.  The impact on state forces has long term residual effects and 
can shape a nation-state's foreign policy.  The state’s legitimacy in executing its foreign 
policy is influenced by all parties acting in its name.  Therefore, it is critical to evaluate 
how PMCs impact the larger picture when deployed to support or augment the state’s 
armed forces. 
Executive Outcomes' deployments in Angola and Sierra Leone augmented both 
states’ capabilities, but EO also detracted from state credibility insofar as they made it  
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obvious that neither state could provide its own security. Executive Outcomes also used 
the Kamajors for human intelligence and as guides. In so doing, they essentially trained 
and armed another group in Sierra Leone.   
The impact on the Angolan government was positive.  The government kept 
political control, reduced the UNITA threat, insured international investments by 
liberating Soyo and secured training for the FAA. Under the Lusaka Protocol, the country 
enjoyed a period of peace.  The same assessment applies to the situation in Sierra Leone.  
In using EO, NPRC regained Freetown and the diamond mines, defeated the RUF, 
trained the FAA, and allowed President Kabbah to stay in power with help from 
ECOMOG.  The Angolan and Sierra Leonean governments, from weak political and 
military starting points, capitalized on EO’s rapid operational successes.  The limited 
contracts ensured that EO would depart once the missions were complete, and not remain 
in-country indefinitely.  The work of EO had an overall positive impact on both West 
African governments. 
In Croatia, MPRI’s assistance to the HV had major impacts. The MPRI advisors 
modernized the HV by training U.S. doctrine and with $100 million worth of surplus 
arms and equipment. HV's new capabilities let them to eject the Serb troops and reclaim 
the Krajina area. The impact on the U.S. was positive as well.  Because of UN 
restrictions, the U.S. and NATO could not act. The HV success propelled the Serbs to the 
bargaining table for the Dayton Peace Accords, opening the political situation so NATO 
could send IFOR through Croatia and into Bosnia.  With MPRI as a proxy military 
company, the U.S. government exerted indirect influence in the region to achieve the 
national objective of stabilizing the Balkans. 
The dramatic increase in the use of private contractors can be conveyed by two 
simple figures. In the Gulf War, the ratio of contractors to U.S. soldiers was 1:60.  Now, 
in the global war on terror, there is one contractor for every three soldiers.191  Blackwater 
employees secure high-level U.S. government officials in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
Afghanistan, Blackwater’s their role was limited. Its impact on the U.S. government was 
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minimal but positive, because Blackwater ensured the security of the Afghan station, thus 
facilitating CIA operations without impeding DoD efforts.   
In Iraq, in a monumental policy shift, mission critical tasks have been transferred 
to armed PMCs.192  There, Blackwater has assumed a more active role with extensive 
PSD operations.  Blackwater's aggressive TTPs have alienated the Iraqi population, 
eroding public support for the U.S. presence and inflaming tension over the U.S. 
military's general security operations.  
Although public opinion and political perceptions represent abstract costs, they 
can have an enduring impact on state armed forces, as illustrated by the long-term impact 
on public perceptions of mercenaries and the military in Europe in the wake of the 
thoughtless looting and pillaging by free companies in the Thirty Years War.  In 
performing contract obligations in Iraq, too often Blackwater PSDs, to facilitate the 
movement of their principals, have engaged civilians and sped away, leaving behind 
damaged property and maimed or dead civilians.  The U.S. military is stuck with the job 
of responding to these controversial incidents and trying settle disputes involving 
Blackwater employees.  Furthermore, without its own intelligence resources and quick 
reaction forces, Blackwater must rely on DoD’s generosity to provide both.193 
Blackwater’s operations in OIF give security to high-level officials, but at the same time 
use DoD resources, complicate relations between DoD and the Iraqi public, damage trust 
in DoD through guilt by association, and erode DoD’s legitimacy.   
F. SUMMARY  
Figure 3 illustrates the relative effectiveness of the three PMCs described in the 
case studies in terms of the five criteria described in Chapter I and discussed at length in 
this chapter. 
                                                 
192 Scahill, Blackwater, 70. 
193 These observations are based on the author's personal experiences in OIF.  The Blackwater team at 
al-Hillah, Iraq would check in with the TOC for situational awareness, to coordinate a quick reaction force, 
and to barter for ammunition.  Their force structure only allows for shooters on PSD, so they must rely on 
others, primarily DoD, for intelligence reports. In summarizing the results of a SFOD-A investigation of a 
Blackwater claim that attacks were immanent for a Situation Report in July 2005, the author characterizes 
their intelligence as “shoddy and unreliable.” 
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Figure 3.   PMC Assessment Summary 
To summarize:  Using the criteria of competence, cost effectiveness, control, 
flexibility, and impact on state forces, EO ranks high on competence and cost 
effectiveness, with a positive effect on its contracting governments while having a 
favorable flexibility rating.  MPRI ranks high in all criteria except flexibility, as their 
operational employment has been limited to advisory roles and is therefore ranked at a 
neutral position.  Blackwater, which unlike EO and MPRI is operating in a more security-
conscious post-9/11 environment, rates high in competence and flexibility, but low on all 
other measurements.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Not since the 17th century has there been such a reliance on private 
military actors to accomplish tasks directly affecting the success of 
military engagements.  Private contractors are now so firmly embedded in 
intervention, peacekeeping, and occupation that this trend has arguably 
reached the point of no return.194  
The case studies of EO, MPRI, and Blackwater illustrate the range and 
capabilities of modern PMCs.   Emerging just as state armed forces lost strength and 
taking advantage of increased demands in the market for security, all three companies 
impacted the tactical and operational battlefields and the strategic situation.  Close 
personal connections to decision makers, well-trained and experienced contractors, 
modern equipment, and strong professional ethics combine to make the modern PMC a 
significant actor in conflict zones. 
As noted in earlier chapters, outsourcing security operations to private firms raises 
legal and ethical questions because PMCs occupy a gray area between two types of 
institutions—state militaries and entrepreneurial corporations—with different standards 
of operations.  In principle, the use of PMCs by states is not unethical.  If an outsourcing 
requirement is both ethical and legal (for example, personal security for diplomats), the 
state is justified in contracting out for services. The author believes that the use of PMCs 
for defensive security of individuals, static sites and convoy operations is ethically 
acceptable, but PMC engagement in offensive operations where they can use violence 
according to their judgment and free of the constraints on government soldiers is not 
ethically sound. 
Of course, the initial decision to contract a PMC does not automatically justify 
subsequent PMC actions.  In just war theory, the decision to employ force (jus ad bellum) 
and decisions about how to employ force once war is engaged (jus in bello) require 
separate analyses.  So, too, state decisions to contract with PMCs for specific tasks must 
                                                 
194 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2005), 1. 
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be separated from subsequent assessment of how the tasks are performed.  The U.S. 
government employs Blackwater legally, but the ethics of how Blackwater executes their 
contract in Iraq is open to question, and the company draws a fine line when it quickly 
transfers and fires employees accused of wrongdoing in order to avoid corporate 
prosecution.  New efforts to regulate PMCs and other civilian contractors by placing 
them under the UCMJ in conflict zones have yet to take effect, so their effectiveness 
cannot be gauged.   
As previous chapters demonstrate, PMCs have proven value in force 
augmentation.  Executive Outcomes, considered the most successful PMC venture in 
modern history, operated as a pure PCC in the days before political debate on the use of 
PMCs.195  It is unlikely that a company could function in the same way today, but in no 
way is it an impossibility.  The effectiveness of MPRI's indirect role in the Balkans is 
unquestionable, while Blackwater’s utility depends on one's point of view.  The DoS 
places a high value on Blackwater's security for government officials, but DoD believes 
that their aggressive tactics disrupt civil-military relations, and that battlefields include 
too many armed civilians who drain valuable resources and are not accountable for their 
actions.    
In terms of competence, the PMCs examined in this thesis perform well; they rely 
on former SOF soldiers at the operator level and on influential, well-connected 
government and military retirees at the corporate level.  It is safe to assume that PMCs 
will maintain current competency levels in order to compete for contracts.  However, 
their cost effectiveness is a thing of the past in the inflated market for privatized security. 
and it is more cost effective to use DoD forces for security operations.196  
The companies described in this thesis are extremely flexible in adjusting to the 
market requirements and providing acceptable solution sets.  Real problems arise with the 
matter of control, as PMCs have traditionally operated without effective state 
                                                 
195 Shadow Company.  This documentary film explores the history and current situation of PMCs 
employed worldwide, focusing on Iraq.  In the film, EO is heralded as model for modern day PMCs in 
successfully completing all contractual obligations without  negative public reaction.   
196 Under the 2008 WPPS II, the cost of contracting 1020 Blackwater employees for 365 days is 
$335.1 million; using soldiers would cost a quarter of that, $81 million. 
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supervision.  Personal trust, shared values, and PMC performance records are not strong 
enough controls. As noted in Chapter II, most European national armies were formed 
after the Peace of Westphalia to re-establish national legitimacy and provide 
accountability in the wake of the devastation caused by the free companies. All three 
companies examined in this thesis have reputations marred by accusations of disregard 
for human rights abuses, including wrongful deaths. 
Outsourcing security functions implies that the PMCs, because they are working 
to help the state fulfill its social contract with the people, thereby represent the state.  The 
outsourcing of governing entire colonies, as seen with the East India Company, elevates 
the role of a PMC to an unofficial, but supported subordinate governmental entity.  But 
mistrust of private military forces—even highly disciplined forces like the Hessians—is 
deeply engrained in American consciousness. Furthermore, use of deadly force by PMCs 
in offensively oriented defensive operations interferes with the state monopoly on 
controlled violence and erodes state legitimacy.  The U.S. government cannot afford 
threats to its legitimacy from state-sponsored actors operating contrary to established 
American ideals.  
What does the future hold?  Private military companies are not the ultimate 
answer to national security objectives.  As the case studies show, PMCs cannot fulfill all 
the roles and responsibilities of a state’s armed forces, the British East India Company 
notwithstanding.  Outsourcing vital security functions to private companies may cause a 
state to lose credibility and legitimacy, while simultaneously complicating the security 
situation.  Properly controlled, with clear guidelines for behavior and a specified mission 
set, PMCs can have a value-added effect to the security situation.  They can perform 
tasks that state armed forces cannot perform or free government forces to focus on more 
critical missions. 
PMCs can possibly achieve the political acceptance as a proxy authority needed to 
act unilaterally where nation-states either cannot or will not, similar to EO’s actions in 
Sierra Leone and Angola or the East India Trading Company in India.  An example 
would be to act in response to ethnic atrocities or a similar type of crisis requiring armed 
humanitarian intervention where time is critical and inaction would condone future 
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atrocities, as currently seen in the Darfur region of Sudan.  Defining the mission, 
establishing the ROE, and providing the necessary oversight and control are all critical in 
such a situation.  The political ramifications of sending a PMC over national forces in a 
humanitarian crisis are significant, but not outside examination. 
Employing a PMC to conduct armed humanitarian intervention could halt any 
genocide and reduce the potential for infectious disease outbreaks.  Covert support is 
preferable, as it does not directly lessen the USG’s legitimacy and credibility abroad as 
exemplified by MPRI in Croatia.  The PMC must be organically self-sufficient and be 
prepared to operate alongside indigenous national armed forces for legitimacy in 
operations and intelligence support.  The financial costs of employing a PMC and 
encouraging an African state to sponsor them is widely considered to be less than 
controlling the effects of a widespread infectious disease outbreak in the U.S.  A Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) such as the Red Cross, or even Amnesty 
International, is not barred from outsourcing security and the remote and lawless areas of 
the world that facilitates atrocities like genocide would be far removed from public 
awareness.  This example assumes a host of conditions, but it is not outside the realm of 
possibilities.  
PMCs are a reality on today’s battlefield and are integrated into the U.S.’ strategy 
in the GWOT, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The interoperability between DoD 
and PMCs will continue to increase as the GWOT continues, thereby increasing PMC’s 
reputation as a legitimate actor alongside DoD.  PMCs like Blackwater, Triple Canopy, 
and DynCorp will continue to transition to a more established role supporting the USG 
and vital allies.  Integrating PMCs into DoD operations not only poses strategic risks as 
enumerated in previous chapters, but also operational and strategic risks.  The sharing of 
classified information, access to restricted areas, and providing sensitive communications 
platforms would facilitate interoperability, but also would also put DoD military forces at 
a greater risk of compromise if the PMCs are not adequately vetted.  The footprint PMCs 
have in relation to DoD will increase as well.  They will continue to tap into the existing 
infrastructure in order to access medical and service support facilities, as well as 
potentially tax operational services such as QRFs and military staffs as they must monitor 
 63
PMCs’ presence on the battlefield.  The benefits of using PMCs provide for an economy 
of force for DoD and post-military career opportunities must be weighed carefully.  The 
longer the supply and demand relationship of outsourcing security lasts, especially in 
Iraq, the more the U.S. population will accept the existence of PMCs.  PMCs’ reputation 
and perception will evolve from a mercenary status to a legitimate proxy authority. 
PMCs in the GWOT offer DoD a competent, economy of force solution to 
providing security for DoS and high value coalition members, but at a great cost to 
national legitimacy, the economic resources previously spread across other USG 
Departments, and their organic assets designed to sustain the force during combat.  Close 
supervision to ensure coordination and compliance with established rules and ordinances 
will facilitate the interaction between DoD and PMCs, but not eliminate the friction 
between the two.     
As the GWOT continues and legal considerations are further defined, PMCs will 
continue to adapt.  More extensive study of the integration of PMCs and state armed 
forces is required to understand private-government military dynamics in combat zones 
and to determine how private military companies can best support U.S. armed forces in 
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APPENDIX.   TYPES OF PRIVATIZED SECURITY 
Private Combat Companies (PCC):  The PCC represents the extreme of the 
professional mercenary company.  PCCs are private companies authorized to use deadly 
force and legally allowed to engage in proactive, offensive operations to kill or capture 
the threat.  The classic PCC is often self-sustainable with all necessary weapons, 
equipment, and personnel integral to the organization.  The PCC members are not 
residents of the employing country, but are granted visas to under a legitimate contract 
with the government.197  Executive Outcomes epitomizes the PCC as a foreign corporate 
entity hired to fight another country’s fight, although EO might dispute this, claiming to 
serve the greater good.  Neither the cause nor the enemy of the employing country is 
necessarily shared by the PCC.  Although the U.S. government does not employ PCCs, it 
is useful to treat such organizations as one end of the spectrum of outsourced security. 
Private Military Companies (PMC):  PMCs is a broad term generally applied to 
any private corporation operating in a combat zone or conflicted area that does not 
engage in pro-active, offensive operations but with authorization to use deadly force 
when necessary.198  PMCs' legal authorization for operations comes from the hiring 
government.  Their charter is usually limited to mobile defensive operations designed to 
protect a person, place or thing.199  The classic PMC engages in multiple operations 
ranging from security to training to military advising.  Blackwater is the prototypical 
PMC, serving as a catch-all organizational solution to quasi-military requirements the 
U.S. military is unwilling or unable to accomplish. 
Proxy Military Companies:  Proxy military companies are PMCs with a strong 
allegiance to their native country; they accept contracts that dovetail with their national 
strategic objectives.  Proxy forces augment the existing military force and, in so doing, 
gain a degree of legitimacy, as the mercenary image does not completely define their 
                                                 
197 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, 13. 
198 Ibid., 14. 
199 Shadow Company. 
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existence. Proxy military companies are private companies that act in accordance with 
their parent nation’s national objectives.  Proxy companies may or may not use direct 
force, but always seek the explicit permission of their parent nation to accept a contract of 
an application of force nature. 
The most prolific proxy company is MPRI, whose senior staff is comprised 
almost exclusively of retired generals with close ties inside and outside the Washington 
beltway.200  Their actions have been closely aligned with U.S. foreign policy and the 
company makes great efforts to work only within the approved frameworks of the DoD 
and DoS.  Proxy forces are a type of PMC that seek to supplement legitimate government 
forces through complementary missions and a supportive role.201  
Blackwater, at the forefront of PMCs, is desperately trying to recover from their 
public relations problems by rebranding themselves as a proxy force to the U.S. 
government.202 In essence, it is better to be seen as a U.S. version of the Swiss Guard, 
disciplined and bound by honor and loyalty to the government they serve, than as a free 
company like those that ravaged the European countryside during the Thirty Years War.  
Private Security Companies (PSC):  PSCs are PMCs that focus on site and 
personnel security.  PSCs are authorized to use deadly force in protecting people, 
facilities and government property, but do not engage in mobile defensive operations.203  
Their charter is usually limited to training indigenous personnel to conduct security 
operations or to personal site security for nominated principals.  PSCs’ training charters 
involve integrating their operations with the local population, only slightly differentiating 
them from Proxy Military Company operations.  Armor Group is an active PSC in Iraq; 
they train Iraqi Ministry of Justice security forces and also provide limited personal 
security at fixed sites with a combination of western and Iraqi personnel.204 
                                                 
200 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 75. 
201 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, 15-16. 
202 Jordan, “Report: Blackwater Killings Unjustified.” 
203 Ibid., 16-17. 
204 Personal interaction with Armor Group in al-Hillah, Iraq.   
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Commercial Security Companies (CSC):  CSCs are private companies that 
focus on industrial security at sites that require an armed guard such as ports, logistical 
hubs or outstations and airports.  CSC operations can overlap with PSC, but the biggest 
difference is that the CSC is employed by the company on a full time, not contractual, 
basis.  Their operations are strictly static, with a stationary defensive posture.  They are 
allowed to arm and train indigenous personnel, but only to bolster perimeter security for a 
site.  Their operations can include rescue operations, immigration, and fire services as 
well.205 
Freelance Operators:  Under the combat directed differentiation of privatized 
forces, freelance operators are individual mercenaries with no formal allegiance or 
legitimate connection to the nation hiring their services.  Freelance operators are the 
opposite end of the spectrum from PCCs.  They are illegitimate, without authority to 
conduct military operations. They are usually individuals lacking a corporate structure.206  
In essence, the term "freelance operators" is a euphemism for modern mercenaries.  The 
UN's requirements for labeling someone a “mercenary” are ambiguous, but at least the 
UN provides a starting place for separating lone operators from legitimate private 
security businesses.  Additional Protocol I to Article 47 of the Geneva Convention (1977) 
defines a mercenary as someone who  
 
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; 
b. does, in fact, take part in activities; 
c. is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain; 
d. is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict; 
 
                                                 
205 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, 18. 
206 Jack Idema exemplifies a freelance operator who conducted his own operations in support of a 
cause. His methods of operation contrast with generally accepted Laws of Land Warfare. He was arrested 
for running an illegal prison and other unauthorized actions.  Although he claims to have been aligned with 
the CIA, both the CIA and Pentagon deny any formal or informal relationship.  He was in Afghanistan 
trying to claim the $50 million bounty by capturing or killing Usama bin Laden.  Idema was released by 
Afghani President Karzai in 2007, having served three of his ten-year prison sentence. 
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e. is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; 
f. has not been sent by state, which is not a party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces. 207  
                                                 
207 Article 47(2), Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Convention 1949. 
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